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Intellectual property rights legislation, and particularly patent law, is roundly 
supported as well as condemned across the globe.  The adoption of the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement in the 1990s 
both expanded the scope of minimal protection as well as the controversy.  One 
factor contributing to the strength and disparity of those opinions is the limited 
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evidence of its actual economic effects.  A central and unresolved issue is the 
question if stronger patent systems enhance national economic growth, or if 
growing countries necessarily evolve the institutions associated with stronger 
patent rights.  In short, which way does the causality flow?  Underlying the 
approach to resolving that issue are measures of the relative ‘strength’ of patent 
systems across countries, called patent ‘scores’ or ‘indexes.’  This paper 
contributes to an understanding of both these dimensions, beginning with an 
examination of the ten available patent indexes.  Emphasis of the analysis is on 
developing countries where the controversies are sharpest and the range of 
protection greatest. 
The available indexes are closely correlated, often statistically inseparable.  
The number of available indexes can be reduced with little loss of information.  
The assessment of patent indexes does enable the identification of the three distinct 
components of those indexes, joining/compliance with international conventions, 
strengthening the national patent office, and enhancing enforcement.  By analyzing 
countries at different stages of economic development, it is apparent that they 
follow a similar progression in enhancing patent law.   
Countries which expedite the process tend to grow fastest, indicating that 
strengthened patent systems lead and not lag growth.  Major enhancements are not 
realized until after improvements in governance efficiency, a substantial 
component of which is curbing corruption.  TRIPS mandates enforcement 
processes but not outcomes, giving member states considerable discretion.  The 
pivot point comes at median middle income countries.  Data envelopment analysis 
is used to measure comparative effectiveness of generating national income 
through patenting.  Low income countries can enhance patent efficiency by two to 
eleven percent compared to the most efficient.  A number can make relatively low 
cost enhancements through the adoption/implementation of international 
intellectual property agreements.  In addition, adoption of these steps signals the 
intent to protect innovation investments.  Middle income countries, more efficient 
as a group, have a large potential scope of improvement, up to fifty percent, but 
mostly by the difficult task of enhancing governing efficiency/reducing corruption.  
It is hoped the results of this analysis will provide additional incentives to 
undertake that process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Developing scoring systems, also referred to as indexes, for measuring the 
‘strength’ of national patent systems has become a bit of a cottage industry in 
recent years.  From initial efforts in 1990 there are at present ten systems publicly 
available, including an effort of my own.  Note should be made that the focus here 
is on patent indexes exclusively, and not on more general Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) indexes which also include components on copyright and trademarks.  
In the first Section of this article I examine and compare the systems, finding that 
most current ones are statistically nearly identical, including those based on 
interview data or on secondary sources.  That means at minimum that there is 
much redundancy in the multiplication of efforts to generate patent strength 
indexes and many can be abandoned with little loss of information.   
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All of these patent indexes – or just one index if my suggestion is ultimately 
followed – have uses, several in fact.  They can be used to track across time 
changes in a country’s patent protection.  Clearly, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, which supports the enhancement of IPR systems worldwide, and the 
World Trade Organization, which in the last completed trade agreement 
incorporated IPR as a trade dimension,1 are interested in tracking the progression 
of IP systems in multiple countries.2  More broadly, public officials as well as 
those who champion the needs of developing countries in particular are keenly 
interested to know what the effect of strengthening patents has on national 
economics and living standards.  There, opinions vary widely, some claiming even 
the least developed countries benefit3 while others take the opposite view, that, 
“[i]f you want to have one tool for imperialistic control, it’s patent law under the 
WTO agreement.”4  At present, there is no clear, persuasive answer to this 
important issue.  Complicating the matter, the costs of strengthened patent rights 
are readily calculated, say as the price of a patented pharmaceutical when enhanced 
rights no longer allow the sale of generics.  Benefits though are more ephemeral – 
increases in employment in R&D, high tech manufacturing or enhanced access to 
importing efficient technologies.  It is difficult to measure these benefits 
conclusively when the counterfactual is not clear. 
Economists have used IP indexes in an effort to quantify the benefits of 
enhanced IPRs by examining the relationship between say foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and a national patent score.5  Typically the relationship is 
strongly positive, but critics rightly question the direction of causality.  Is it 
enhanced IPRs which lead to rising FDI, or does the group of countries which 
attract FDI have in place the institutions which also raise the index scores?  Here 
the critics have a legitimate point; the correlation between per capita national gross 
domestic product (GDP) and patent scores is in the range of 0.88, statistically 
indistinguishable at the five percent level.6  
In the second Section of this analysis I examine the direction of the causal 
relationship.  Emphasis is on developing countries because as a group they have 
the most divergent index scores and debate the merits of IPR most strenuously.  
My results indicate that enhanced patent systems lead to stronger economic 
performance, and not vice versa.  Indeed there is even evidence of a progression of 
steps taken by countries as they move from lower low income to higher middle 
                                                          
 1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 
1197, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
2 See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (describing the reporting process for TRIPS 
compliance). 
3 See World Intellectual Property Office, Economic Development and Patents, 
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/economic.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (“Many 
countries, in particular least developed countries, have only begun to address the challenges of setting 
up an appropriate patent system in place to reap economic and social benefits.”).  
4 See Nic Paget-Clarke, Interview with Vandana Shiva: The Role of Patents in the Rise of 
Globalization, MOTION MAG., Aug. 27, 2003, available at http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/global/v 
shiva4_int.html#Anchor-The-34478. 
5 See infra Section III.A. 
6 See infra Section III.A. 
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income.  That progression begins with joining/complying with the relevant 
international organizations, and progressing to enhancing the efficiency of delivery 
of government services, or reducing corruption, to put the matter more bluntly.  By 
following these measures countries can be seen as signaling their intention to 
stimulate inventive activity.  Within this general progression there is a wide range 
of effectiveness with which individual countries achieve those steps, as is revealed 
by an application of data envelopment analysis.  The national benefits from 
successful execution are substantial, above thirty percent in a few cases, but so is 
the complexity.   
II. PATENT INDEXES 
As of the time of writing, there are ten available patent indexes of two 
distinct types.  One form is based on a review of national patent legislation only, 
which is to say does not include an assessment of implementation/litigation matters 
while the second form does, either by incorporating factors representing litigation 
or through surveys of individuals with a direct knowledge of the actual operation 
of patent systems in each country included.  The number of indexed countries is 
quite large, well over 100 for most systems, meaning that values are available for a 
range of developing countries for which the patent strength issue is most 
contentious.  However, not every system includes exactly the same mix of 
countries so comparisons among the systems, while indicative, are not definitive.   
In this section, the available patent index systems are described and critiqued 
according to their method of composition and compared statistically.  Included is 
an index of my own design first presented in 2002 and updated here. 
A. Review of Available Patent Indexes 
The currently available indexes are as follows: 
Based on IP law: 
Rapp and Rozek (1990) 
Ginarte and Park (1997) with updates to 2005 
Park and Wagh (2001) updated annually to 2006 
 
Incorporating implementation/enforcement factors: 
Mansfield (1995) 
Sherwood (1997a) and (1997b) 
Taylor Wessing Global Intellectual Property Index 2009 
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 2009 
Property Rights Alliance International Property Rights Index 2010 
Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report 
Lesser (2002) 
Rapp and Rozek7  (R&R) based their five point ranking system, the first 
                                                          
7 See Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection 
in Developing Countries n.11 (Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs., Inc., Working Paper No. 3, 1990) 
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effort to establish an international patent index, on the minimum standards set by 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  That is, most attention is given to laws “in force 
against infringement but not on their enforcement or implementation.”8  Their 
approach is based on that described in Gadbaw and Richards.9  In total, 160 
countries are ranked.10 
Ginarte and Park11 (G&P), in a broadening of the Rapp and Rozek index,12 
use a score based on the sum of five national components: 
• extent of coverage (pharmaceuticals, food, etc.), 
• membership in international agreements, 
• loss of protection (compulsory license provisions, etc.), 
• enforcement mechanisms (provisions for injunctions, pleadings, 
etc.), and 
• duration of protection (standard = twenty years). 
A sensitivity test was done on the effects of a range of weights in the ranking 
of countries under the system.  As the results are quite insensitive to the weights 
tested, an un-weighted sum is used.  The absence of consideration of enforcement 
is justified by noting, “the main concern about [developing countries] is the 
absence of laws [on infringement].”13  This index appears to be the most frequently 
used in other studies and by 2005 includes ranks for 122 countries.14 
Park and Wagh (2001)15 and (2002)16 (P&W) in the spirit of Ginarte and 
Park17 calculate index values in five-year increments from 1970-2000 and annually 
through 2006.18  Their system is based on five categories, (1) coverage (patentable 
subject matter), (2) duration of protection, (3) enforcement mechanisms, (4) 
membership in international patent treaties, and (5) limitations like compulsory 
licenses on patent rights.  Each category has a maximum value of one so the index 
can range from zero to five while sub-categories contain from one (duration of 
protection) to seven components (patentable subject matter).  Hence, the 
patentability of pharmaceuticals adds 1/7 to a national index while membership in 
the Paris Convention adds 1/3.  There is no discussion of the derivation of the 
                                                          
[hereinafter R&R]. 
8 Id. 
9 See R.M. GADBAW & T. J. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, 
GLOBAL CONFLICT? 11, 52-55 (London: Westview Press 1998).  
10 See R&R, supra note 7, at tbl.A-1. 
11 See Juan C. Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-National Study, 
26 RES. POL’Y, 283, 301 (1997) (original report contains five year incremental values 1960-90 with 
updates to 2005) [hereinafter G&P].  
12 See R&R, supra note 7. 
13 See G&P, supra note 11, at 289. 
14 PROP. RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX 2010 REPORT 139 (2010), 
available at http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ [hereinafter IPRI]. 
15 W.G. Park & S. Wagh, Intellectual Property and Patent Regimes, in ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF 
THE WORLD: ANNUAL REPORT 2001 ch. 4 (J. Gwartney & R. Lawson eds., 2001), 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/efw/efw2001/efw01-ch4.pdf [hereinafter P&W]. 
16 Id. at ch. 2. 
17 See G&P, supra note 11. 
18 See P&W, supra note 15, at ch. 2 (data available at http://www.freetheworld.com/datasets_efw 
.html). 
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weights nor if, for example, the patentability of foods should be valued at less than 
half of the significance of the existence of preliminary injunctions.  In all, sixty 
three countries are ranked in 2000,19 140 in 2006 when the supporting 
organization, Economic Freedom of the World,20 broadened its category on 
property rights from being specifically IP rights to real and financial property. 
Mansfield (1995)21 (M) surveyed 180 executives and patent attorneys in the 
U.S., Japan and Germany.  Focus was on the chemical and drugs, machinery, and 
electrical equipment industries believed to be particularly sensitive to intellectual 
property protection.  Respondents were asked for fourteen more technologically 
advanced developing countries to indicate when IP protection was ‘too weak’ to 
permit transfer of sensitive technologies to (a) invest in joint ventures, (b) wholly 
owned subsidiaries and (c) licensing key technologies.  In general, protection 
levels were considered more adequate for machinery than chemicals and drugs. 
Sherwood (1997a)22 (S) also utilized a judgment-based ranking, relying on 
his own assessment of the conditions in eighteen developing countries, most in 
Latin America.  Each country was ranked on a 100-point scale for nine 
components including enforceability (twenty-five points), administration (ten 
points), and patents (seventeen points).  The scales were thoroughly researched 
with interviews in each country.  A verbal justification is given for deducting 
points in each component, but the overall allocation of points to each component is 
not discussed.  Thus, there seems to be a major arbitrary component to the system 
despite the care which went into its construction.  Using a similar procedure, 
Sherwood (1997b)23 scaled the TRIPS requirements.  They received a score of 
fifty-five, identical with the value given to South Korea, the highest granted of the 
eighteen countries.  In contrast, the IPR aspects of NAFTA (North American Free 
Trade Agreement) are ranked at a sixty-eight.  
Taylor Wessing Global Intellectual Property Index 2009 (TW ‘09).24  Unlike 
the other indexes reviewed here this is a private firm effort available without 
charge but registration is required.  Initiated in 2008, the current version ranks just 
twenty-four countries developed, emerging and larger developing countries.  Due 
to the restricted number of countries included in this index, it is of limited use in 
the current analysis.  Moreover, the overall index is a compilation of scores for 
trademark, patent and copyright protection; here the focus is solely on the patent 
index.   
The index is based on a combination of two distinct components, referred to 
                                                          
19 Id. at tbl.2. 
20 CATO INST., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs 
/efw. 
21 E. Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment and Technology Transfer: 
Germany, Japan and the United States (World Bank Int’l Fin. Group, Discussion Paper No. 19, 1995) 
[hereinafter Mansfield]. 
22 R.M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of 
Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261, 262-371 (1997) [hereinafter Sherwood]. 
23 R.M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 
492-545 (1997). 
24 Taylor Wessing, Taylor Wessing Global Intellectual Property Index, 2009 Methodology, 
http://www.taylorwessing.com/ipindex/methodology.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter 
Taylor Wessing]. 
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as ‘jurisdictional assessments’ and ‘instrumental factors.’  The former is a fifty-
three item questionnaire completed by 495 respondents consisting of CEOs and 
lawyers.  The core of the questionnaire consists of a 1 – 10 (high) ranking of 
elements of national IP, for patents the elements being (1) obtaining and 
maintaining, (2) exploiting, (3) enforcing/cost-effectiveness, and (4) attacking 
(Appendix A).  The selection of the respondents is not described beyond a request 
on the questionnaire (question fifty-one) for respondents to forward to “business 
contacts and associates who may be interested in helping us with this survey.”25  
For their part, the instrumental factors26 are a group of forty-nine existing indexes 
and data.  Examples include the ‘Ease of Doing Business’,27 the ‘Human 
Development Index,28  and Legal Enforcement of Contracts.29 Many of these 
components are used/reported elsewhere in this current analysis of patent indexes.   
Coalescing a series of components into a single score requires, of course, 
some process.  In the case of the Taylor Wessing Index, the process is called a 
‘factor assessment model’ using support vector machine mathematics (SVM).  
“For each of the 16 areas covered by the questionnaire the predictions made by the 
SVM are combined with the actual assessments to create a matrix of how each 
respondent assessed or was predicted to have assessed each of the twenty-four 
jurisdictions.”30  No additional details are given on how the SVM is applied, nor 
which statistical package is utilized making it not possible to assess the 
methodology further. 
The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 2009 (WEF/IPR 
‘09) provides annually an assessment of the competitiveness of 133 countries.31  
The full index incorporates both hard data and a survey of the international 
business community, utilizing twelve so-called ‘pillars of competitiveness.’  Of 
relevance here is not the full index, but a result from the opinion survey on 
intellectual property protection, indicator 1.02 from the 1st pillar, Institutions.  The 
question asks, “[h]ow would you rate intellectual property protection, including 
anti-counterfeiting measures, in your country?”32  In total, 12,614 surveys were 
retained after editing for an average of ninety five responses per country with 
actual response numbers ranging from 373 (China) down to thirty one (Libya, 
Timor-Leste).33  There is no discussion of the respondent process nor the changes 
in respondents over time.  Both on-line and hard copy survey collection processes 
are used with answers scored on a one to seven (high) scale.  For purposes here, it 
is important to recall that the survey value applies to all IPR and not just patents, 
                                                          
25 Id. at question 51. 
26 Id. at app.C. 
27 Doing Business, Economy Rankings, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (last visited Nov. 
16, 2010). 
28 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI) (2010), http://hdr.undp.org/ 
en/statistics/hdi/. 
29 FRASER INST., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2009) available at 
http://www.freetheworld.com/release_2009.html [hereinafter ECONOMIC FREEDOM ANNUAL REPORT]. 
30 Taylor Wessing, supra note 24. 
31 WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009-2010, http://www.wefo 
rum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullreport.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT]. 
32 Id. § 1.02. 
33 Id. at 49 tbl.1.   
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or as used here is it a composite index like the others being based as it is on a 
single question. 
Property Rights Alliance International Property Rights Index 2010 (IPRI 
‘10)34 operates from the premise that property rights play an important role in 
prosperity.  The index is based on three core components, the legal and political 
environment, physical property rights, and intellectual property rights with the last 
of direct relevance here.  The IPR component itself is composed of three variables, 
the Global Competitiveness Index question on IP protection, the Ginarte-Park 
Index of Patent Rights, and a measure of copyright piracy.35  The first components 
are assessed separately above and while the International Property Rights Index 
brings nothing truly novel to this assessment of patent indexes it does present an 
alternative approach to the others. 
The Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report (EFW)36 used to 
incorporate an element on intellectual property.  However, beginning in 2007, that 
component has been replaced by one related to the protection of property rights 
broadly, including for financial assets,37 with that data drawn from the World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report.38  As a result, the Economic 
Freedom of the World is not of direct relevance to this analysis. 
B. Constructing an IPR Score 
1. Components of an IPR Score 
Lesser39 in constructing a new scoring system to reflect patent protection in 
the post-TRIPS era noted prior scores typically have in common the following 
components: 
• protectable subject matter 
• convention membership 
• enforcement 
• administration 
• duration of protection 
Harmonization under TRIPS simplifies some inputs into the index.  For 
example, TRIPS40 sets the duration of patent protection at twenty years from first 
application so that an indication of TRIPS compliance by a country captures the 
duration factor as well as serving as a proxy for protectable subject matter.  
However, as countries have the option of protecting plants with patents or an 
‘effective sui generis system,’ or both,41 it is important to identify the choice made.  
                                                          
34 See IPRI, supra note 14. 
35 Id. at chs. III-IV.   
36 ECONOMIC FREEDOM ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29. 
37 Id. at 194. 
38 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, supra note 31. 
39 W. Lesser, The Effects of Intellectual Property Rights on Foreign Direct Investments and Imports 
into Developing Countries in the Post-TRIPS Era, 5 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGY TODAY 1, 2-16 (2002). 
40 TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 33. 
41 Id. at art. 27.3(b). 
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Most countries are opting for Plant Breeders’ Rights rather than patents for plants 
for which membership in UPOV, the international convention, is a strong indicator 
if not actually required.  India for example has a Protection of Plant Varieties and 
Farmers’ Rights Act of 200142 but is not a member of UPOV. 
Additional and more current information on enforcement issues was needed 
so a practitioners survey was developed.  The survey was sent to patent attorneys 
and licensing executives of biotechnology firms in the U.S. and Europe following 
an extensive period of instrument development and in-person interviews.  Public 
sector licensing officers were contacted as well.  In total, seventeen surveys and 
interviews were distributed with a response rate of fifty-nine percent.  
Biotechnology firms (pharmaceutical and agricultural) are an appropriate response 
group because the importance of IPR protection to that sector means a high level of 
awareness of technology transfer issues.  The survey results emphasized how 
important a factor the enforceability of IP statutes is in a country.  Slowness of a 
national court system, poor standing of a foreign plaintiff, lack of technical 
competence, or inability to enforce a judgment once made were all reasons to 
downgrade the effectiveness of a national system.  
Repeating the initial list, the duration of protection can be dropped as a 
component while cost of protection can be added, as follows: 
• protectable subject matter 
• convention membership 
• enforcement 
• administration 
• cost of protection 
Ways of quantifying each of these components using public sources were 
described as: 
Protectable subject matter: As noted, TRIPS mandates a minimum scope 
of subject matter for patent protection so that satisfaction of the TRIPS 
requirements is an indication of the allowable subject matter.  Countries must 
certify their compliance with WTO in the IP/N/1/[3 letter country code]/P 
publication series.  Those which have certified compliance are noted with a 1; a 0 
is used otherwise.  Under TRIPS,43 countries are obliged to implement the 
provisions within prescribed time periods based on their level of development.  For 
developed countries, the period was one year following the date of entry into force 
of the WTO Agreement, and for developing countries five years, and up to ten for 
products not previously protected.  The least developed countries are allowed ten 
years or up to January 2006 with additional extensions considered on request.  For 
pharmaceuticals products, the Doha Declaration44 extended the deadline until 
January 2016.   
The only subject area where compliance is not fully indicative is for plants, 
                                                          
42 The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2000, No. 53, Acts of Parliament, 
2001, http://www.grain.org/brl_files/india-pvp-2001-en.pdf. 
43 TRIPS, supra note 1, at arts. 65-66. 
44 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
of 14 November 2001, ¶ 7, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001). 
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where countries under Article 27.3(b) TRIPS45 have the option of using patents 
and/or Plant Breeders Rights (PBR).  Membership in UPOV (a 1, 0 otherwise) is 
taken as an indication of the selection of the PBR option.46   
Convention membership: In addition to membership in UPOV, signatories 
to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)47 are also noted (1 = member, 0 = not 
member).  Participation in the PCT serves several functions for inventors, largely 
by reducing direct and indirect costs of application.  Membership in the Paris 
Convention48 is no longer a meaningful distinction for most countries are now 
members and compliance with 1967 Convention Articles 1-12 and 19 is mandated 
by TRIPS.49  
Cost of protection: While an important issue for firms, no data set of costs 
existed while only a few countries made posted fees readily available through a 
website or other system.  Thus, it was not possible to include a measure of 
costliness in the scoring system. 
Administration: Patent office administration incorporates a range of critical 
factors from efficiency and transparency to adequacy of funding and training of 
examiners.  Of these, the technical competence of examiners, when substantive 
examination is undertaken, is perhaps most significant.  Such competency should 
be observable directly by examining the educational background and experience of 
employees, and indirectly by the number of granted patents which are overturned 
by the courts.  For the former, few patent offices provide information on the 
backgrounds of their employees.  With regards to court challenges, as one survey 
respondent noted, cases brought reflect not a random sample of issued patents but 
rather those cases which are both ambiguous and potentially involving significant 
sums.  As a result, differences across countries can reflect a number of factors in 
addition to the actions of a patent office.  Then, there is the issue of the 
transparency of a national court system which can affect the outcome and the 
absence of a database on cases brought and their resolutions, so that approach is 
not viable.  Ginarte and Park50 identified related reasons for abandoning an attempt 
to use a measure of complaints against a patent system. 
As an expedient, the decision was made to distinguish between those patent 
offices which maintained a detailed web page, and those which did not (1 = web 
page exists, 0 = does not exist).  The presence of the web page is then taken to 
reflect an office which is better supported and more interconnected.   
Enforcement: Enforcement takes particular relevance due to the emphasis 
placed on it by the survey respondents.  Yet again there is no generally available 
ranking of national legal systems, assessments of the competence of justices, and 
the like.  There, the choice was made to use the Transparency International 
                                                          
45 TRIPS, supra note 1. 
46 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 1961 (membership list 
available at http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/en/about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf). 
47 World Intellectual Property Organization Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=6 [hereafter PCT]. 
48 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883. 
49 See TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 2. 
50 G&P, supra note 11, at 290. 
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“Corruption Perceptions Index” (CPI) for 1998.  The annual index then ranked 
ninety-nine countries on a zero (highly corrupt) to ten (highly clean) scale.  Each 
country score is an average of three to fourteen individual surveys of the 
perceptions of corruption as seen by business people as well as 
“country/risk/expert analysts.”51  All such indexes have the limitation that they 
reflect perceptions only, but as Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón52 note, the 
subject is “inherently subjective” yet “perceptions of the quality of governance 
may often be as important as objective differences in institutions across countries.”  
Limitations nonetheless remain for, as Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón53 emphasize, there is substantial unexplained error in any estimates, to the 
point that that individual country CPI rankings are not statistically differentiable.  
Second is the matter of interest - here largely the competency and integrity of the 
IP court system – and what is measured, aggregate perceptions of corruption in 
private-private and private-public interactions.  This distinction can be seen in 
reference to the U.S. which has a 1998 CPI value of 7.5, eighteenth on the list.54  
Whatever the integrity of other kinds of interactions may be, the U.S. is widely 
regarded as having a highly effective IP court system, particularly after 1982 when 
patent appeal cases were consolidated in a new Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.55  Nonetheless, the CPI does represent a systematic effort to quantify 
aspects of the application of law in a diverse group of countries. 
2. Constructing a Scoring System 
Of the eighty-five countries included in the 1998 CPI,56 forty-four are 
developing countries, which constitute the sample used.  The sample is not a 
random one, but does represent a diverse geographical and economic range of 
countries. 
A key step is identifying a proper weighting scheme for aggregating the 
values into a single index figure.  For his purposes, Lesser57 sought a more 
systematic approach, in particular the use of factor analysis.  In this case, a three-
factor model with a verimax rotation provided results explaining a total of seventy-
seven percent of the variance of the variables. 
 
 
                                                          
51 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010: LONG METHODOLOGICAL BRIEF 
(2010), available at http://www.transparency.org/policyresearch/surveysindices/cpi/2010/indetail#4.  
52 See e.g., D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay & P. Zoido-Lobatón, Governance Matters 2 (World Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2196, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=188568. 
53 D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay & P. Zoido-Lobatón, Aggregating Governance Indicators (World Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2195, 1999), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/gov 
ind.pdf. 
54 See CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 1998, infra note 56. 
55 See P.W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY ch. 2 
(Clarendon Press 4th ed. 1999). 
56 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 1998, available at http://www.tran 
sparency.org/policyresearch/surveysindices/cpi/previous_cpi/1998.  
57 Lesser, supra note 39. 
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3. Updating and Expanding the Scoring System 
Several factors have changed since the initial work in 2002.  For one, 
establishing a website has become far simpler so that the mere existence of a patent 
office site signifies little.  As an alternative, the ability to search a national patent 
database online is used.58  The sites can then be searched for the existence of 
online search capacity (scored 1, 0 otherwise).  It should be emphasized that the 
issue is not any option to search a patent data file that is provided on a central and 
regional basis by the World Intellectual Property Organization among other 
groups,59 but rather, the capacity of a national office to offer that function. 
The concept of implementing TRIPS requirements has not changed since the 
2002 analysis – TRIPS60 Article 63.2 requires countries to notify the World Trade 
Organization when laws and regulations pertaining to meeting TRIPS 
commitments have been adopted – but the presentation of data have migrated.61   
TRIPS notifications also apply to notification on enforcement, but the form 
of those notifications is considered inadequate to assess the level of enforceability 
at the national level.  The CPI for 2009, now available for 180 countries, remains a 
strong possibility with the strengths and weaknesses as described above.62 
However in the interim period, several other possible measures of enforceability 
have become available.  These include World Bank data on the cost of doing 
business in countries,63 and particularly the cost of contract enforcement.  There 
are clear if imperfect connections between the enforceability of contracts and 
enforcing patent rights.  Specifically, the data report the number of days required, 
number of steps in the process and the cost measured as a percent of the claims.  
The World Economic Forum64 has a related question (1.05) on judicial 
independence, “[t]o what extent is the judiciary in your country independent from 
influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?”  A third measure of 
corruption is the World Bank Institute variable, Control of Corruption, defined as 
“perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain” 
including both corruption, both small and grand, and the ‘capture’ of the state by 
the elite and private interests.65  However the correlation with the CPI, r = .98, is 
                                                          
58 World Intellectual Property Organization, External Databases, http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/ 
en/dbsearch/national_databases.html (last visited March 31, 2011) (for a list of international patent 
office websites); see also World Intellectual Property Organization, Patentscope: International and 
National Patent Collections Search, http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/search/en/search.jsf (last visited 
March 31, 2011) (for access to national and international patent office searches). 
59 Id.  International searches are available at http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/; while multiple 
national and regional patent files can be searched from a central point at 
http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/search/en/search.jsf. 
60 TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 63.2. 
61 TRIPS implementation notices are available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/int 
el8_e.htm. 
62 Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón, supra notes 52-53; CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 1998, 
supra note 56; TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2009, http://www.transparenc 
y.org/policyresearch/surveysindices/cpi/2009/cpi2009table. 
63 Doing Business, Enforcing Contracts, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/Enforcing 
Contracts/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
64 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, supra note 31, § 1.05. 
65 World Bank, Control of Corruption, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf. 
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so high as, again, to provide no additional information over using the CPI.66   
Used in composing a score, the World Bank data however led to odd results.  
This is perhaps a result of the range of the data; while the cost of enforcing 
contracts in many countries was in the twenty-five to thirty-three percent range, 
several came in a well over 100%.  The World Economic Forum data67 on judicial 
independence has a simple correlation of .85 with the Corruption Perception 
Index,68 and using the nonparametric rank sum test, the two series are not 
independent at the ninety-five percent confidence level.69  Thus, since the judicial 
independence data bring little new information and in order to retain consistency 
with the 2002 index, the decision was made to continue use of the Corruption 
Perception Index. 
Applying factor analysis to generate weights for a four component model 
indicated that the PCT component was redundant in the sense that it added little to 
the explained variance (up twenty percentage points and giving a weighting of 
nearly one (.997)).70  This means that for the 142 PCT members – accounting for 
nearly all countries in the current data set – the index is increased by one point 
(.997).  Dropping it leaves three components with, in this case, a three-factor 
model with an equamax rotation.71  This provides results which could be described 
in terms of the expected underlying relationships as follows: 
Factor 1 (35%): Scope, weighing most heavily on UPOV and TRIPS 
compliance 
Factor 2 (28%): Enforcement, weighing most heavily on the CPI 
Factor 3 (27%): Institution, patent office efficiency/ sophistication 
The factor weights, which explain a total of ninety percent of the variance of 
the variables, are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Computed Factor Weightings of the Three Component Index Model 
 Scope Enforcement PO Efficiency Communality 
CPI ‘09 .214 .949 .201 .986 
UPOV .895 .169 .198 .868 
TRIPs .720 .366 .306 .745 
PO Eff. .220 .201 .953 .996 
% Variance 35 28 27 90 
 
The aggregate factor values (communality) are used to weigh the individual 
index components in generating the IP score; that is, the computed communality 
value from Table 1 is for each country analyzed multiplied by the data value for 
that country.  The weights have the intuitive appeal that the near-greatest weight is 
                                                          
66 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
index.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).  
67 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, supra note 31. 
68 CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 1998, supra note 56. 
69 Results not shown for brevity; the rank sum test described at http://www.stat.auckland.ac.nz/ 
~wild/ChanceEnc/Ch10.wilcoxon.pdf. 
70 Results of four component factor model suppressed for brevity. 
71 Factors were computed using Minitab Version 15 for Windows. 
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placed on the CPI, a proxy for the enforceability of IPR, which the survey 
respondents indicated as the most significant aspect of the effectiveness of patents 
at the national level.72  As significant is patent office efficiency/sophistication.  
Compared to the 2002 index, this component has become more significant, but 
since the variable used to measure it has changed no direct comparison can be 
made.73   
The three factors can, alternatively, be viewed as differing approaches to 
strengthening patent systems.  Countries may (1) join/implement international 
agreements (TRIPS, UPOV), (2) enhance the operation of their patent offices, or 
(3) improve enforcement by reducing corruption.74  The strongest rights of course 
are achievable only by being well established in all three dimensions.  But not all 
countries presently have strong systems and hence have alternative paths available 
for strengthening them.  For example, they may in a matter of degrees focus first 
directly on patent systems by say fully implementing TRIPS, or they may first 
tackle enforcement/corruption and then shift attention to the patent system in 
particular.  Which approaches are pursued and the consequences are explored 
further in Section III.75 
The resulting index values, referred to here as the ‘Cortez Patent Index,’ are 
presented in Table 2 for 148 countries in 2009.  The country selection was 
determined largely by data availability, but some countries in non-equilibrium 
states (like Afghanistan) were dropped, as were very small and fledgling states like 



















                                                          
72 See supra Section II.B.1.  
73 Lesser, supra note 39. 
74 See infra Sections III.B-C. 
75 See infra Section III. 
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Table 2: Computed Patent score – the Cortez Patent Index, Selected 































Congo DR 1.8734 
Costa Rica 6.8388 
Cote d’Ivoire 2.0706 
Croatia 5.8528 
Cyprus 7.2526 
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Saudi Arabia 4.2398 
Senegal 2.958 
Serbia 4.447 



































The first step in evaluating the available patent indexes is to consider the 
correlations among them.  Correlations, even high correlations, are not in 
themselves indicators of significance overlap among the scores.  Rather, that 
relationship can be assessed further by examining the significance of the 
relationship using a rank sum test or other statistical tests.   
Considering first the correlations among the several indexes when first 
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developed, which is to say in the 1990s, the relationship between the Mansfield76 
and Sherwood77 scales is fairly strong (r = .663).78  On the other hand, the 
relationship is weaker between Sherwood’s and the two legislation-based systems 
(r = .144 and .060) for R&R79 and G&P80 respectively.81  Given the related base of 
those latter two indexes, it is surprising they are not very closely correlated (r = 
.235).82  The correlations for the most recent index values are reported in Table 
3.83  In all cases it is important to recognize that the countries with reported scores 
are not the same for all indexes so the computed correlations reflect some sample-
difference effects.84  Since the years differ slightly across the indexes there is 
possibly also a year effect reflected in the results. 
 
Table 3: Correlations Among the Major IP Indexes, Mid-2000s85 
 Cortez ‘09 WEF/IPR G&P ‘05 IPRI ‘10 P&W ‘06 
Cortez 
‘09 
1     
WEF/IPR 
‘09 
.84 1    
G&P ‘05 .80 .63 1   
IPRI ‘10 .87 .93 .70 1  
P&W ‘06 .80 .90 .61 .91 1 
 
Considering these correlations individually, it can be noted that the 
relationship between the G&P86 and P&W87 indexes has strengthened since the 
1990s, from r = .235 to .61.88  Very likely this change reflects the standardization 
of patent legislation following the large scale implementation of the TRIPS89 
legislation as these are both legislation-based indexes.  The strongest correlation, r 
= .93, is between WEF/IPR90 and IPRI,91 which is not surprising as those indexes 
apply to all IP while the remaining three are patent-specific.92  The next-strongest 
                                                          
76 Mansfield, supra note 21. 
77 Sherwood, supra note 22. 
78 Computed. 
79 R&R, supra note 7. 
80 G&P, supra note 11. 
81 Computed. 
82 Computed.  
83 Computed.   
84 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
85 Computed; data sources as identified in left-most column. 
86 G&P, supra note 11. 
87 P&W, supra note 15. 
88 Computed. 
89 TRIPS, supra note 1. 
90 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, supra note 31. 
91 IPRI, supra note 14. 
92 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
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correlation, r = .91, between P&W93 and IPRI is a little surprising as IPRI uses the 
G&P94 index in its composition, not P&W,95 but then both are text-based indexes 
and so share clear similarities.96  The third highest correlation value, r = .90, is 
between WEF/IPR and P&W.97  There is no new information there.  Rather, it is a 
reflection of the transitivity rule: since IPRI and WEF/IPR are strongly correlated 
and the same applies to IPRI and P&W, then it follows that WEF/IPR and P&W 
must be strongly correlated as well.   
Wakasugi and Ito98 attempted to resolve the relative merits of legislation 
based and those incorporating aspects of enforcement by comparing the Park and 
Wagh99 index with one based on the 2007 responses of 5,500 Japanese firms with 
overseas affiliates regarding IPR enforcement in forty-five countries.100  Using the 
survey they were able to collect actual data on the investments and royalty 
payments from affiliates in those forty-five countries.101  They found an r = .70 
correlation between the two indexes, notable if not quite as strong as some in Table 
3 above, but noted that for seventeen countries the two diverged by more than ten 
percent.102  Using GLS regression analysis they report the signs and statistical 
significance of the explanatory variables were nearly the same whether the P&W 
or survey index was used, but that the elasticity of royalty payments when using 
the survey index was .96, notably higher than the .36 when the P&W index was 
used.103  That is, the index which incorporated enforcement considerations 
reflected more accurately the actual overseas investments in affiliates than did the 
legislation-based index.  That result is not really surprising. 
What is perhaps most notable in Table 3 is the strong correlations of the four 
other indexes with the Cortez Index.104  As an indication of the strength of these 
correlations, the ranking of countries under the Cortez and IPRI105 indexes is not 
significantly different at the ninety-five percent level using the rank sum test.106  
The existence of an overriding commonality in these indexes is suggested.  That is, 
as is noted below,107 countries at different levels of development have multiple 
routes available for enhancing their patent index values.  They can join/satisfy 
international organizations, enhance the operation of the patent office, or improve 
                                                          
93 P&W, supra note 15. 
94 G&P, supra note 11. 
95 P&W, supra note 15; see also supra Section II.A. 
96 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
97 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, supra note 31; P&W, supra note 15. 
98 Advanced Practice Education Associates Conference (“APEA”), Ryuhei Wakasugi & Banri Ito, 
Protection of Intellectual Property and International Technology Transfer: Empirical Evidence (July 
25-26, 2007), http://www.apeaweb.org/confer/hk07/papers/wakasugi-ito.pdf. 
99 P&W, supra note 15. 




104 See supra tbl.2. 
105 See IPRI, supra note 14. 
106 Computed; see supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing the rank sum test). 
107 See infra Section III.D. 
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enforcement.108  The evidence, that alternative patent index systems which use 
distinct means to quantify those components result in such closely aligned results, 
suggests the existence of a dominant underlying component of the indexes, as is 
revealed again through transitivity.  If A and B are both closely correlated with C, 
then A and B also must be strongly correlated.  In Section III an attempt is made to 
identify just what aspect of the index constitutes this ‘C.’109 
Pursuing the possibility of a dominant underlying dimension further, 
correlations are indeed generally found to be very strong.  For example, r = .89 
between WEF/IPR110 and the EFW111 measure of judicial independence, while r = 
.90 between CPI112 and WEF/IPR (which by transitivity means CPI is also highly 
correlated with judicial independence, r = .85 to be exact).  Cases where 
correlations are not strong are between the CPI113 and World Bank measures of the 
cost of doing business,114 namely the cost and time for contract enforcement.  
Those correlations are, respectively, r = -0.36 and -0.22.  The negative signs are 
understandable as for example as contract enforcement becomes more costly as a 
proportion of the settlement amount the implication is enforcement is more 
cumbersome.  The low correlation values perhaps further reflects the wide 
diversity in the “Cost of Doing Business” figures.115 
D. Conclusions Regarding Patent Indexes 
The above assessment indicates there are far closer parallels among the 
available indexes than there are differences among them.  In general, there are both 
conceptual reasons and some empirical evidence to prefer the indexes which 
measure aspects of enforcement over the purely legislation based ones, although 
the distinctions appear more important when analyzing individual countries than 
the overall conclusions.  More generally though the closeness of the several 
indexes suggests that at the current level of sophistication of index construction 
any one will serve about as well as another, particularly when evaluating trends 
rather than individual country results.  Practical matters must also be considered, 
namely that WEF/IPR116 and IPRI117 are being supplied annually while the others 
at present are not.118  Hence the suggestion in the introduction above119 that a 
                                                          
108 See supra Section II.B.  
109 See infra Section III. 
110 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, supra note 31. 
111 See ECONOMIC FREEDOM ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29. 
112 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2009, supra note 62. 
113 Id. 
114 WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2010: COMPARING REGULATION IN 183 ECONOMIES (World 
Bank, International Finance Corporation, and Palgrave MacMillan 2009), http://www.doingbusiness.org 
/documents/fullreport/2010/DB10-full-report.pdf. 
115 See supra Section II.B. 
116 See GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, supra note 31. 
117 See IPRI, supra note 14. 
118 It would of course be possible for any research to create the Cortez Patent Index for any year for 
which data is available.  The text here lays out the construction process in detail.  Researchers must 
decide whether to utilize the weights presented here or recalculate the weights every year.  This is a 
common issue with computing indexes.  See WILLIAM G. TOMEK & KENNETH L. ROBINSON, 
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single patent strength index will serve most purposes.  We now turn to the more 
complex question of the causality between indexes and economic growth.  As a 
key element, the observation that countries at different levels of development have 
alternative approaches to strengthening their index score is utilized. 
III. PATENT INDEXES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
A. Causality 
As among the components of patent indexes, strong correlations abound 
between the indexes and measurements of GDP, R&D and technology licensing 
per capita.  Using PPP (Purchasing Power Parody)120 per capita as an alternative 
measure of GDP, which adjusts for national purchasing power and hence better 
reflects national standards of living, the correlations are between r = 0.75 and 0.84.  
As noted though, correlations do not demonstrate causality, or directions of 
causality.  For example, Rapp and Rozek observe, “[p]harmaceutical R&D is 
conducted in those countries where intellectual property is protected.”121  
Pharmaceutical R&D is often analyzed because the sector is a heavy investor in 
R&D and, due to the relative ease of copying compounds once discovered, 
depends more than most industries on strong patent protection.  However, as we 
have seen, countries with strong patent systems also tend to be wealthier with 
larger markets so the observation that pharma R&D is associated with stronger 
patent rights does not help in identifying the direction of causality; whether, strong 
IPR leading to R&D, or R&D contributing to strengthened IPR through 
institutional enhancements associated with wealthier nations.122  
Ginarte and Park conclude that the level of IP protection is driven not by the 
level of economic development (such as is measurable as GDP/capita) but rather 
by the determinants of economic development – R&D expenditures, market 
freedom and openness.123  Concerning R&D in particular, they detect evidence of 
distinct sub-groups and divide the sample into those with above and below median 
levels of R&D per capita investment.  The results indicate R&D is important for 
the richer group but not for the poorer, indicating why stronger patent rights might 
not be of interest/value to the poorer sub-set.  Particularly, they suggest the 
underlying factor is the size of R&D; some critical minimum size (likely nationally 
                                                          
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT PRICES 190-92 (Cornell U. Press, 3d ed. 1990). 
119 See supra Section I. 
120 WORLD BANK, GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA 2009: ATLAS METHOD AND PPP (2009), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. 
121 R&R, supra note 7, at 19. 
122 More recent evidence from India though does suggest that causality runs from strong patent 
rights to R&D investments.  See Biswajit Dhar & K.M. Gopakumay, Effect of Product Patents on the 
Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, at 53-56, http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/Papers/3.pdf.  India did not allow 
product patents for pharmaceutical products from 1970 to 1995, leading to limited domestic R&D 
directed to the discovery of new compounds.  Id.  However from 1995 to 2004, domestic pharma R&D 
increased more than six fold to almost US $340 million, with domestic non-generic producers investing 
most heavily.  Id.  Interestingly, multinational firms operating in India raised domestic R&D very little 
post-1995.  Id.  
123 See G&P, supra note 11, at 297. 
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determined) may be needed to justify the expense of a strong patent system. Of 
course, a counter argument can be made that R&D investments increase once the 
government/institutional factors are in place to protect those investments, that is, 
that R&D is a lagging not leading indicator of economic development.  
Alternatively, Ginarte and Park find openness of an economy is statistically 
important for poorer nations but not for the richer group, if only because richer 
nations are generally fully open.124  
Here I evaluated exceptions to a direct relationship between a patent score 
and PPP/capita by ranking both and examining those countries where one rank was 
notably higher or lower than the other.  In practice I took the squared difference 
between the rankings of the Cortez Index and PPP/capita and found eighteen 
countries for which the PPP/capita greatly exceeded the rankings of the Cortez 
Index value.  Of those eighteen, fifteen are leading natural resource exporters, 
particularly oil.125 This relationship makes perfect sense; resource-endowed 
countries do not need to stimulate innovation to prosper and so do not invest in 
complex IPR systems.  Only three countries in this group (Bosnia, Egypt and 
Lebanon) are not major natural resource exporters.   
Conversely, there are but six countries for which the Cortez Index value far 
exceeds their PPP/capita rank, Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, and 
Nicaragua.126  This group requires further evaluation.127  Re-computing the 
correlations with the fifteen natural resource-dependent countries excluded does 
little to change the figures.  The correlation between the Cortez Index128 and 
PPP/capita is then r = 0.88 while between PPP/capita and CPI129 r = 0.90, and r = 
0.95 between the Index and CPI.  Exploring further, the correlation between the 
CPI and the WEF measure of judicial independence130 is r = 0.76.  It is of no great 
surprise that removing fifteen countries from a list of 148 does not change the 
underlying relationships.  But these correlations do emphasize the apparent 
existence of fundamental determinant relationships among this data.131  As was 
discussed above,132 countries have available three distinct approaches to 
strengthening patent systems: enhancing enforcement by reducing corruption, 
joining/complying with international conventions, and, finally, enhancing patent 
office operations.  Due to the particularly strong correlations existing between 
several measures of corruption and the available patent indexes, as a working 
hypothesis corruption/enforceability of IP rights is identified as the fundamental 
causal factor among the several indexes.  That is, the level of corruption/governing 
efficiency is hypothesized to be the principal determinant of countries stronger 
                                                          
124 Id. at 298. 
125 The fifteen countries are: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus (a re-exporter of oil 
from Russia), Brunei, DR Congo, Gabon, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Venezuela.  Id. 
126 Computed; for brevity analysis not shown. 
127 See infra Section III.C. 
128 See supra tbl.2. 
129 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010, supra note 51. 
130 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, supra note 31. 
131 See infra Section III.C. 
132 See supra Section II.B. 
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patent index scores, and subsequently moving to higher income levels.  Alternative 
explanations are explored further below,133 but as will be seen, the mechanism 
chosen by countries to enhance patent rights is central here to identifying the 
direction of causality.  First though, we examine in more depth the effects of 
corruption on patent systems and enforcement. 
B. Role of Enforcement and Corruption 
Students of the economics of corruption typically use the term to refer to the 
misuse of government office, the paying of government representatives not to do 
their jobs (in contrast to expediting a process, as with tips).134  Corruption at high 
levels affecting policy is particularly problematic.  Perhaps though for some cases 
the term ‘corruption’ is too strong a one.  Corruption is difficult to define and 
identify in practice, has legal implications, and a moralistic dimension.  Indeed, 
under some systems, corruption is seen as permitting governments to function, and 
not as an evil.135  The particular term used though is not important; what is is the 
consequences.  The inept, non-systematic delivery of public services, including 
allocations based not on stated criteria and merit, has the same effect of creating 
uncertainty, and uncertainty is anathema to the long term investments required for 
much innovation.  Ineffective governance can be attributable to inexperience, lack 
of technical and organizational skills, or conflict with traditional approaches, in 
addition to corruption in the legal sense.  Thus for those uncomfortable with the 
broad use of the concept of government corruption, particularly when specific 
evidence is limited, the term ‘ineffective governance’ can be used interchangeably.   
The broad characteristics of inefficiency and uncertainty are not different 
across many corrupt/ineffectively governed countries, many of which are poor, for 
just those reasons.  The World Bank’s 2005 World Development Report, A Better 
Investment Climate for Everyone, makes the point, repeatedly, that, “secure 
property rights and good governance are central to economic growth. . .”.136  And, 
“the more secure the rights, the faster the growth.”137  In those instances the 
reference and examples are to real property while TRIPS provides some specific 
connection between the real and intellectual property. 
To that end, it is instructive to consider how the TRIPS agreement treats 
enforcement.  Clearly, the framers understood the significance and, unlike prior IP 
agreements, TRIPS138 contains detailed provisions relating to the enforcement of 
those rights.  However, the drafters “recognized that differences in the legal means 
to enforce IPRs were enormous among countries, and that such differences could 
                                                          
133 See supra Section II.C. 
134 See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 
1320, 1346 (1997). 
135 Dexter Filkins, Inside Corrupt-istan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2010, at 6 (“while public graft is 
pernicious, there is no point in trying to abolish it – and that trying to do so could destroy the very 
government the West has helped to build”). 
136 WORLD BANK, 2005 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR 
EVERYONE 2 (2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/complete_report.pdf. 
137 Id. at 79. 
138 See TRIPS, supra note 1, at pt. III. 
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not be reasonably eliminated.”  Thus the provisions “rather than prescribing how to 
ensure enforcement, determine what the outcomes of the adopted measures should 
be.”139  TRIPS Article 41.1 reads in part (emphasis added), “[m]embers shall 
ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available under 
their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of 
intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement. . .”   
Several points can be made regarding this article.  The focus is clearly on the 
availability of procedures to remedy enforcement limitations, and not on the 
application of those procedures in individual cases.  It is as always difficult to 
define and measure when action has indeed been ‘effective,’ and moreover the 
issue at hand is infringement which itself is defined in national law.  Among the 
TRIPS mandated procedures are: 
Article 41.2: “Procedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights shall be fair and equitable.  They shall not be unnecessarily 
complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.”  
And 
Article 41.4 (in part): “Parties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for 
review by a judicial authority of final administrative decisions . . .”  
But “[m]embers shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system.” 
(Article 1.1 in part).  And (Article 41.5): 
It is understood that this part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial 
system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the 
enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to 
enforce their law in general.  Nothing in this part creates any obligation with 
respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and the enforcement of law in general.140 
From this overview it is evident the framers of the TRIPS agreement 
consider enforcement provisions to be critical, central, to an effective IPR system, 
but mandating specific legal systems is not feasible for a multi-state agreement.  
But, limiting requirements to certain minimal procedures leaves great discretion in 
implementation to national authorities.  In short, the effectiveness of enforcement 
under TRIPS can be expected to vary considerable among nations.  Unsurprisingly, 
not all countries will find the resulting levels of enforcement adequate.141  Some 
will ascribe the inadequacies to governing inefficiencies, to inexperience and 
inadequate expertise, or to corruption.  For those countries which do choose to 
enhance enforcement, a costly and complex undertaking, why do they differ from 
the others?  What motivates them? 
                                                          
139 CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 409 (2007) (interpreting the TRIPS articles relating to 
enforcement). 
140 See also TRIPS, supra note 1, at arts. 42-45. 
141 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 
(2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1906 (identifying particular intellectual property violation 
concerns regarding specific countries). 
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C. National Incentives to Curb Corruption 
Since countries have few detailed enforcement mandates under TRIPS, it is 
relevant to ask what leads some countries to establish high standards, which are 
both complex to implement and costly.  We turn next to incentives for nations to 
make those changes, considered within the broader context of curbing overall 
corruption/enhancing governance.  As an underlying consideration, it is assumed 
that corruption reduction is a complex and often wrenching process which can 
affect political alignments as power bases change.  The complexity of the process 
can be seen in the World Bank Institute’s report on Ghana’s National Anti-
Corruption Strategy.142  
The report, prepared at government request in the context of a return to 
constitutional rule, was a response to “growing official and civil society 
recognition of the dangers of corruption, and the need to curb it.”143  Identified 
obstacles to reducing corruption included: weak political will, mixed signals from 
the Executive Branch, weak institutions, an inadequate adherence to the rule of 
law, entrenched patronage, weak private sector, weak civil society, and pervasive 
cynicism.  To this list can be added government ‘capture’ by elites.  The incentive 
in this instance for the Ghanaian government to tackle corruption was a return to 
constitutional rule, but others exist, including: 
• Public outcry over an environmental catastrophe followed by a 
weak government response.  Examples include the Russian wild 
fires during the 2010 summer.144   
• The rise of an educated middle class with the expectation of greater 
control.  India with its new technologies and industries is an 
example.  Among other changes, the larger middle class affects the 
power base of the established elites. 
• Direct financial incentives, such as access to foreign aid if reform 
stipulations are met.  An example is the US Millennium 
Challenge.145 
• The rise of enlightened leadership or other forms of serendipity.  
Enlightened leaders from inside and outside government ranks have 
included Nelson Mandela, Gandhi, and Gorbachev.146   
                                                          
142 WORLD BANK, REPORT ON GHANA’S NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/A1-durban-ghana.pdf.    
143 Id. 
144 L. Shevtsova & D.J. Kramer, In the Russian Wildfires, Will Putin get Burned, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 15, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/13/AR20 
10081302642.html) (“The poor response to the fires will further widen the chasm separating the 
nation’s authorities from society.  Even before Russia began burning, 82 percent of citizens surveyed by 
the state-run VTsIOM polling agency said state officials do not respect the law.”). 
145 Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, 108th Cong. (Council on Foreign Relations, 1st Sess. 2003) 
available at http://www.cfr.org/poverty/millennium-challenge-act-2003/p16232. 
146 More serendipitous changes include events following the death of Guinean dictator Lansana 
Conte’ in 2008.  See Guinea’s First Free Election Praised for Transparency, CNN WORLD, July 28, 
2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-28/world/guinea.elections_1_carter-center-election-period-presi 
dent-lansana-conte?_s=PM:WORLD (Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara seized power but was seriously 
wounded in an assassination attempt the following year, and while he survived under overseas care, he 
has promised not to return.  That led the way to democratic elections in June 2010 with a runoff 
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The intent here is to select one of the above and document through national 
examples how the incentive led to reductions in corruption and rises in the strength 
of patent protection, followed by enhanced growth rates.  This path serves as an 
example of how countries responses to incentives effectively enhanced IP 
enforcement and thereby accelerated growth.  The incentive evaluated here is the 
financial one, in particular the US Millennium Challenge Act.  The Challenge 
Corporation was created in 2004 as a government-funded but independent foreign 
aid corporation which invests in countries committed to good governance, 
economic freedom, and investment in their citizens.  Accepted countries must 
score above the median relative to their income level peers in the ‘ruling justly’ 
and ‘economic freedom’ criteria, and above the median on the ‘control of 
corruption category’.147  Indicators are sourced from third parties – the control of 
corruption data from the World Bank Institute148 – and it is both possible and 
precedented to be de-certified if the criteria fall below the established standards. 
The countries selected for the initial analysis are those six identified above149 
as having a Cortex Index rank substantially exceeding their PPP per capita rank: 
Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, and Nicaragua.  Although identified 
purely empirically, this is a standout set of nations.  The World Bank150 identified 
among a handful of countries making particular progress in reforms Ghana and 
Morocco (international software sales) and Ghana and Nicaragua (enhancements in 
real property rights).  Moreover, Ghana, Morocco and Nicaragua are three of 20 
presently with MCA funding (Nicaragua’s was terminated in 2009), and Jordan 
and Kenya represent two of eighteen with Threshold Programs; a program with 
Liberia is under preparation.  Kenya’s program is specifically focused on 
reductions in corruption in public procurement.  Clearly, these are reform-minded 
countries.   
As regards economic growth, data in Table 4 indicates these countries 
typically grew faster at or before program eligibility; a showing of advances with 
the MCA goals is required prior to eligibility.  Of course no analysis of a small 
number cases like this is likely to be absolutely in agreement.  In some cases the 
divergence from the expected enhancements in growth can be explained by 
exogenous factors, such as the upheavals occurring in Kenya in early 2008 
following a contested election.  Other cases like Nicaragua are not consistent with 
expectations at all, but then Nicaragua lost its eligibility in 2009 exactly for not 
meeting the MCA goals.  In general though countries which made a commitment 
to enhance governance, and through that process increased their patent index 





                                                          
scheduled for later in the year.). 
147 See Millennium Challenge Act, supra note 145, § 606-07. 
148 See supra Section II.B. 
149 See supra Section III.A. 
150 2005 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 136. 
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Table 4: Relative Real GDP Growth Rates for Six Countries with Strong 
Patent Index Scores 
Country ‘95-2000 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 
Ghana       
Global + - + + - ++ 
Regional - ++ ++ + + ++ 
Jordan       
Global + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Regional - ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Kenya       
Global — — + + ++ —* 
Regional — ++ ++ + ++ —* 
Liberia       
Global ++ — - ++ ++ ++ 
Regional ++ — + ++ ++ ++ 
Morocco       
Global — - — ++ — ++ 
Regional — - — ++ + — 
Nicaragua       
Global ++ - - — — — 
Regional + + — — — — 
Key: + <1% higher; ++ >1% higher; - <1% lower; —>1% lower 
Shaded numbers indicate when Millennium Challenge Account program eligibility began 
* year of political ferment 
Data: World Bank data available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
D. Hypothesis and Analysis 
The five case countries discussed above are sufficient only to establish that 
countries, given an incentive, can work to improve governance/reduce corruption 
which in turn strengthens patent rights and economic growth.  There are alternative 
approaches to the same end, namely joining international IP agreements and 
strengthening the patent office.151  Both approaches increase the patent score.  It is 
then an empirical question which is the more effective approach to increasing 
national incomes or growth.  Of course by answering that question we are 
effectively also determining whether stronger IP rights lead to - cause - economic 
growth, or if economic growth also raises IP rights, or reverse causality.   
Of the two approaches identified, the one involving joining international 
conventions and/or strengthening the patent office is clearly the direct one focused 
specifically on patent rights.  If countries which use that approach are more 
economically successful then it can reasonable be concluded enhanced IP leads to 
higher incomes and growth.  That is, there is no strong argument that growth per se 
leads countries to invest in their patent offices so when countries do, and grow, it 
                                                          
151 See supra Section II.B. 
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can reasonably be concluded that the improvement caused the economic growth.  
Conversely, if enhanced governance/reduced corruption leads to the growth, that is 
an indirect way to enhance patent rights through improved enforcement while 
simultaneously strengthening other government sectors.  Thus, growth led by 
enhancing the governance process is the causal factor, and strengthened patent 
systems is one indirect factor in that growth; governance leads to growth and to an 
improved patent system.  Enhanced governance is both the more complex and 
encompassing reform so it can be expected that countries which implement that 
approach are more successful, rapidly growing/ higher income ones.   
To test these hypothesizes factor analysis is again used employing three 
factors and equamax rotation.152  Countries are classified as low, middle 
(combining lower and upper middle) and high per capita income according to the 
World Bank method.153  Income categories are divided into above and below the 
median level and compared.  Results for the low income group are shown in Table 
5, and in Table 6 for the middle income nations. 
 
Table 5: Factor Weightings for Low Income Countries, Above Median 
Income 
 Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 Communality 
CPI ‘09 .138 -.938 -.211 .994 
UPOV .859 -.032 -.369 .875 
TRIPs .764 -.505 -.061 .843 
PO Eff. .203 -.198 -.945 .973 
% Variance .575 .178 .156 .909 
 
The only factor with any explanatory power in Table 5 is factor 1, which 
applies to international agreement membership/compliance.  The negative signs in 
factors 2 and 3 can be interpreted as ‘not,’ as not CPI and not PO efficiency.  Thus 
the more economically successful (above median) of the lowest income countries 
are members of the international agreements related to IP and have satisfied their 
TRIPS obligations, but have not advanced on either corruption reduction or 
strengthening patent office practices.  A factor analysis model could not even be 
applied to the sub-median income grouping of these low income countries, which 
is to say the poorest of the poor.  The reason is lack of variability; that category as 
a group is not even members of the international IP agreements, or satisfied their 
obligations under those agreements.  They indeed have advanced in no way on 






                                                          
152 See also supra Section II.B. 
153 World Bank, How We Classify Countries, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifi 
cations (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).  
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Table 6A: Factor Weightings for Median Income Countries, Above Median 
Income 
 Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 Communality 
CPI 
‘09 
.919 .084 .092 .859 
UPOV .164 .966 .132 .977 
TRIPs .748 .370 .222 .745 
PO 
Eff. 
.130 .129 .981 .997 
% Var .362 .273 .260 .894 
 
Table 6B: Factor Weightings for Median Income Countries, Below Median 
Income 
 Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 Communality 
CPI 
‘09 
.062 -.038 -.992 .989 
UPOV .879 -.032 -.175 .804 
TRIPs .800 .322 .068 .749 
POEff. .106 .978 .038 .969 
% Var .357 .266 .255 .878 
 
The higher income of the median group (Table 6A) have, compared to the 
below median group, addressed corruption/enhanced governance more effectively 
and complied with their TRIPS obligations.  Secondly, they joined UPOV and 
enhanced patent office functioning.  In contrast, the below median income group 
(Table 6B) joined/complied with the international conventions and secondly 
invested in patent office practices, but have not made advances in reducing 
corruption.  That is, the lower of the median income countries is closest to the 
upper group of the low income cohort, but also invest in their patent office 
practices. 
E. Conclusion on the Direction of Causality 
Within these four groupings of countries by income levels there is a clear 
progression of steps related to enhancing patent protection.  The lowest have done 
nothing, the next steps being joining/satisfying the relevant international 
agreements, and strengthening the patent offices.  Finally, corruption/governing 
efficiency is addressed.  This sequence is not surprising, for working within the 
international agreements involves the least commitment, while enhancing 
governance is a complex and far reaching undertaking.  This relationship between 
commitment and scope would be widely recognized by investors so that by 
undertaking each, countries are signaling varying levels of intent to foster 
innovation incentives.  More significantly, the sequence identified here supports 
the explanation that countries specifically target strengthened IPRs as an economic 
growth mechanism and, indeed, income growth follows.  That is, stronger IPRs 
contribute to growth, and are not a consequence of that growth.   
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Of particular relevance in that conclusion is the stage at which national 
patent offices are enhanced.  Unlike joining the WTO/TRIPS, which provides 
enhanced trade access, there are no benefits to a strengthened patent office beyond 
the direct benefits of what those patents provide.  Thus the decision to invest is 
made on its own merits, and does contribute to growth.  The final component 
assessed here, corruption reduction, has the broadest reach and is most closely 
connected with national income levels.  However, corruption reduction generally 
follows advances in democracy except in those cases when there is a particular 
motivation.154  Thus countries seem able to raise incomes to some degree by 
focusing directly on strengthening IPR systems, but beyond some level corruption 
reduction becomes paramount, and corruption reduction follows economic growth.  
The income level at which that tipping point occurs?  The evidence presented here 
suggests median middle income countries.   
IV. INDIVIDUAL STATE ANALYSIS 
The preceding section provides some general direction for nations interested 
to enhance income through a strengthened patent system by identifying the usually 
most promising directions for enhancements.  Yet more country-specific 
indications of the relative standings of countries as regards the components of their 
systems would be of assist to any reform plans.  In this section that analysis is 
reported using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
A. Data Envelopment Analysis 
DEA is related to a class of linear programming-based measures of 
production efficiency.  DEA however is a non-parametric estimator which removes 
the necessity to specify a (potentially erroneous) relationship between inputs and 
outputs and hence is particularly well suited to the application to the patent issues 
examined here.  As a simple, conceptual example of DEA, Beasley155 examines 
four bank branch operations for their relative efficiency.  Each branch has one 
input, staff number, and two outputs, number of personal and business transactions 
completed.  Applying DEA, two branches are found to have an efficiency ranking 
of 100 with the other two estimated at forty-three percent and thirty-six percent.  
These are known as technical efficiencies, the technical success of the branches in 
translating staff numbers into completed bank transactions.  DEA analysis can also 
be used to compute allocation efficiencies, the degree to which technical 
efficiencies align with input costs.  Computing allocation efficiencies however 
requires data on costs – staff costs in the bank analysis example.  In our patent 
analysis we have no cost data on say reducing corruption/enhancing governance 
efficiency and so our application is limited to technical efficiencies. 
Returning to the bank branch example, Beasley156 makes the important 
                                                          
154 See also supra Section II.C. 
155 J.E. Beasley, Operations Research Notes, http://people.brunel.ac.uk/~mastjjb/jeb/or/dea.html 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
156 Id. 
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observation that the branch with a thirty-six percent technical efficiency allocation 
should not be taken to indicate that branch is nearly one third as efficient as the 
branches with a 100 efficiency ranking.  Rather these relative efficiency rankings 
indicate that if the poorer-performing branches adopted the same practices as those 
ranked higher they would be able to enhance their own performance.  Stated more 
generally, Tauer, Fried and Fry157 note that the entities ranked as 100s are on the 
technical efficiency frontier.  The frontier is calculated based on the data used in 
each analysis; different data will lead to a different calculated frontier.  As such the 
frontier represents the best feasible practice, not some abstract representation.  This 
is both a strength and weakness of the technique; efficiency is evaluated relative to 
a particular set of peers.  Additionally, the analysis assumes that the practices 
available to one entity are available to all peers as well, and that the production 
process is similar for all entities analyzed. 
The analysis here uses freeware, specifically R158 and FEAR159, an R 
package.  These programs are not for the faint-of-heart.  As a non-parametric 
method, standard goodness-of-fit techniques do not apply.  Simar and Wilson160 
have however identified a bootstrapping technique which re-samples the data-
generation process and, by comparing to the original estimate, mimics the 
distribution of the original estimator.  This bootstrapping technique is available in 
FEAR and is used to estimate the confidence intervals of the estimated efficiency 
scores. 
B. Analysis and Results 
Applying DEA to the patent data requires specifying both inputs and outputs.  
Inputs are, as have been presented previously, the four components of the Cortez 
Patent Index, CPI, UPOV membership, satisfying of the TRIPS requirements, and 
patent office efficiency.161  Outputs of interest include, as discussed previously, 
both PPP/capita162 and GDP growth rates.163  Both are used here.  The FEAR 
software further requires specifying whether the production frontier represents 
variable, non-increasing, or constant returns to scale.  Variable returns to scale was 
selected as the most flexible option.  But re-running the analysis using both 
constant and non-increasing returns indicates that while the numerical values did 
change, the relative positioning was largely unaltered.   
The analysis is run separately for low and middle (combining lower and 
                                                          
157 Loren W. Tauer, Harold O. Fried, & William E. Fry, Measuring Efficiencies of Academic 
Departments within a College, 15 EDUC. ECON. 473, 489 (2007). 
158 R-Project, The R Project for Statistical Computing, http://www.r-project.org/, (last visited Nov. 
16, 2010). 
159 Clemson University Faculty, Biography of Professor Paul W. Wilson, http://www.clemson.edu/e 
conomics/faculty/wilson/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
160 Leopold Simar & Paul W. Wilson, Sensitivity Analysis of Efficiency Scores: How to Bootstrap in 
Nonparametric Frontier Models, 44 MGMT. SCI. 49, 61 (1998).   
161 See supra Section II.B. 
162 GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA 2009, supra note 120. 
163 World Bank, GDP Growth, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2010) (listing the average GDP growth for low income countries from 2004-2009 and 
for middle income countries for 2005-2009).  See also supra Sections III.A,C.  
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upper) income countries as the low income countries may not have all the options 
available to the medium level, a key assumption of DEA.  The results are reported 
in Tables 7 and 8 for the low and medium groups respectively, with their 
respective bootstrap confidence intervals164 presented in Appendix Tables A and 
B.   
There are clearly many factors which contribute to a country’s income and 
growth levels, including such factors as resources, location, population size and 
growth rate, educational levels, infrastructure, etc.  Indeed, very little is 
explainable solely by the level of CPI, UPOV membership, TRIPS status and 
efficiency of the patent office, which is to say by the components of the Cortez 
Index. This point is apparent from a simple reading of Tables 7 and 8.  Few would 
anticipate countries like Chad and Pakistan to be at or near the efficiency frontier.  
Rather the results should be read in the reverse: due to their growth and income 
levels, those countries define the frontier.  It is instructive to examine the 
differences in the DEA results for four inputs (col. 2), one input (CPI, col. 3), and 
three inputs (UPOV, TRIPS, PO, col. 5).  These differences are reported 
respectively in columns 4 and 6.  Notable first is that few low income countries, 
indeed but five of thirty-one, would benefit from joining UPOV, satisfying TRIPS 
obligations and/or enhancing the national patent office.  For those that would, 
benefits would be modest – on the order of three to four percent (.02/.64) 
compared to what more efficient peer countries have achieved.  This result is 
consistent with the finding in Section III.D that the below-median group of the low 
income countries has done little to enhance the standing of their patent systems so 
as not to register on the sample-determined DEA frontier.  In short, with few 
examples of membership, the DEA approach provides little direction for this low 
income group of countries.  For those which do register though, as noted above, 
the benefit is in the three to four percent range, which is notable.   
All analyzed countries do have a CPI number, and there the analysis 
indicates an improvement of up to ten percent (Mauritania, Nepal, Guinea) 
possible by emulating the practices of other countries with similar CPI scores.  
Interestingly, two of the countries identified for a Cortex Index ranking higher than 
their PPP/capita rank, Ghana and Kenya, can improve their performance by four to 
five percent by following the practices of peer countries.165  Their governments 
appear to have identified a need but have as yet not benefited fully from addressing 
it. 
Considering the middle income countries (Table 8) the country level analysis 
supports the general conclusions above.166  That is, the below-median group 
typically enhanced their patent systems by first joining/complying with the 
relevant international organizations and improving the patent office, while the 
above median ones went on to deal with corruption/governing efficiency.  What 
though is revealed by the analysis in Table 8 is the degree of efficiency among 
countries in following these general steps.  Considering column 6 which reports 
the difference in efficiency when considering UPOV/TRIPS/PO only, most 
                                                          
164 Based on 2,000 iterations. 
165 See supra Section III.C. 
166 See supra Section III.D. 
LESSER- FORMAT FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:02 PM 
376 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. IV:II 
 
countries show no difference in efficiency, indicating they are utilizing these 
aspects at the efficiency frontier.  A number of countries though are well below the 
frontier – up to twenty-one percent for Ecuador (.14/.65) and seventeen percent for 
both Paraguay and Ukraine.  The very large value for Sudan is a puzzle which 
possibly can be explained by its failing state with government institutions one of 
many victims. 
Far more common and pernicious is the relative inefficiency with which 
numerous countries manage corruption/delivering government services.  A number 
of countries are thirty percent or more off the efficiency frontier, which, it is 
important to recall, is defined by actual accomplishments of peer middle income 
countries and not by some hypothetical standard.  Among that group are Armenia, 
Bhutan, Egypt, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, and India.  The appearance of both 
Egypt and India on the list should not be surprising as both have a regrettable 
reputation for corruption and governmental ineptitude.   
 
Table 7: Data Envelopment Analysis, Low Income Countries, 2 Outputs, 1, 3 
and 4 Inputs   










Bangladesh 0.72 0.68 -.04 0.72 0 
Burundi 0.36 0.36 0 0.34 -.02 
Cambodia 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0 
CAR 0.31 0.29 -.02 0.31 0 
Chad 1.00 1.00 0 0.92 -.04 
Congo DR 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
0.55 0.55 0 0.55 0 
Ethiopia 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0 
Gambia 0.65 0.63 -.02 0.65 0 
Ghana 0.69 0.66 -.03 0.69 0 
Guinea 0.38 0.34 -.04 0.37 .-01 
Kenya 0.64 0.61 -.03 0.62 -.02 
Liberia 0.55 0.55 0 0.55 0 
Madagascar 0.55 0.54 -.01 0.55 0 
Mali 0.51 0.48 -.03 0.51 0 
Mauritania 0.80 0.72 -.08 0.80 0 
Malawi 0.62 0.62 0 0.62 0 
Mozambique 0.70 0.70 0 0.70 0 
Nepal 0.50 0.46 -.04 0.50 0 
Niger 0.46 0.46 0 0.46 0 
Pakistan 0.93 0.93 0 0.93 0 
Senegal 0.66 0.62 -.04 0.66 0 
Sierra Leone 0.62 0.62 0 0.61 -.01 
Tajikistan 0.89 0.85 -.04 0.89 0 
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Tanzania 0.70 0.70 0 0.70 0 
Togo 0.31 0.27 -.04 0.31 0 
Uganda 0.79 0.79 0 0.79 0 
Uzbekistan 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0 
Vietnam 1.00 0.96 -.04 1.00 0 
Yemen 0.79 0.79 0 0.79 0 
Zambia 0.63 0.61 -.02 0.63 0 
 
Table 8: Data Envelopment Analysis, Middle Income Countries, 2 Outputs, 
1, 3 and 4 Inputs 













Albania 0.59 0.51 -.08 0.54 -.05 
Algeria 0.63 0.44 -.19 0.63 0 
Angola 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0 
Argentina 0.86 0.86 0 0.86 0 
Armenia 0.77 0.53 -.23 0.77 0 
Azerbaijan 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0 
Belarus 1.00 0.79 -.21 1.00 0 
Bhutan 0.72 0.49 -.23 0.72 0 
Bolivia 0.36 0.32 -.04 0.33 -.03 
Bosnia 0.77 0.54 -.23 0.77 0 
Botswana 0.94 0.69 -.25 0.94 0 
Brazil 0.68 0.57 -.11 0.62 -.04 
Bulgaria 0.81 0.71 -.10 0.77 -.04 
Cameroon 0.26 0.19 -.07 0.26 0 
Chile 0.73 0.73 0 0.73 0 
China 0.57 0.57 0 0.57 0 
Colombia 0.52 0.52 0 0.52 0 
Costa Rica 0.70 0.64 -.10 0.70 0 
DR 0.69 0.57 -.12 0.69 0 
Ecuador 0.65 0.48 -.18 0.51 -.14 
Egypt 0.60 0.41 -.19 0.60 0 
El 
Salvador 
0.54 0.37 -.17 0.54 0 
Gabon 0.94 0.68 -.26 0.94 0 
Georgia 0.45 0.42 -.03 0.45 0 
Guatemala 0.47 0.32 -.15 0.47 0 
Guyana 0.30 0.21 -.09 0.30 0 
Honduras 0.44 0.31 -.13 0.44 0 
India 0.52 0.35 -.17 0.52 0 
Indonesia 0.45 0.33 -.12 0.45 0 
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Iran 1.00 1.00 0 0.96 -.04 
Jamaica 0.55 0.40 -.15 0.55 0 
Jordan 0.48 0.46 -.02 0.48 0 
Kazakhstan 0.9 0.66 -.33 0.96 0 
Latvia 1.00 0.92 -.08 1.00 0 
Lebanon 1.00 0.72 -.28 1.00 0 
Lithuania 0.92 0.92 0 0.92 0 
Malaysia 1.00 0.74 -.26 1.00 0 
Mauritius 1.00 0.72 -.28 1.00 0 
Mexico 0.97 0.77 -.22 0.85 -.08 
Mongolia 0.53 0.36 -.17 0.53 0 
Morocco 0.32 0.32 0 0.32 0 
Nicaragua 0.20 0.20 0 0.20 0 
Nigeria 0.35 0.25 -.10 0.35 0 
Panama 0.79 0.79 0 0.79 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.32 0.26 -.06 0.33 .01 
Paraguay 0.40 0.36 -.04 0.33 -.07 
Peru 0.76 0.57 -.19 0.76 0 
Philippines 0.41 0.30 -.11 0.41 0 
Poland 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0 
Romania 0.82 0.82 0 0.82 0 
Russia 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0 
Serbia 0.91 0.64 -.27 0.91 0 
So Africa 0.57 0.57 0 0.57 0 
Sri Lanka 0.55 0.37 -.18 0.55 0 
Sudan 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 -.50 
Suriname 0.60 0.42 -.18 0.60 0 
Syria 0.47 0.32 -.15 0.47 0 
Swaziland 0.38 0.27 -.11 0.37 -.01 
Thailand 0.62 0.45 -.17 0.61 -.01 
Tunisia 0.51 0.48 -.03 0.51 0 
Turkey 0.74 0.74 0 0.74 0 
Ukraine 0.52 0.41 -.11 0.43 -.09 
Uruguay 0.81 0.75 -.06 0.81 0 
Venezuela 1.00 1.00 0 1.00 0 
 
In India’s case just consider the debacle over preparing for the 
Commonwealth Games.167  Numerous other countries while not as deficient as 
                                                          
167 Jim Yardley, As Global Games Begin, India Hopes for Chance to Save National Pride, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at 6 (“The answer, to many of those involved with the [Commonwealth] games, is 
that India’s political culture, if prized for its commitment to democracy, often seems unable to 
transcend its own dysfunction.”). 
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those named above nonetheless have much potential to enhance national economic 
standards by improving the efficiency of governmental operations, which in many 
cases requires reducing corruption.  That more countries have not advanced in this 
area further attests to the complexity and lack of compelling incentives to do so. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
While the pathway from the introduction here to the conclusions is tortured, 
the conclusions themselves are straightforward.  Patent indexes are largely 
interchangeable, although those which capture implementation/enforcement 
aspects are to be preferred over those which reflect legislation only.  Some savings 
could be made by reducing the current overlapping of available indexes.  As 
regards the larger and thornier question of the direction of causality between the 
strength of a patent system and an economy, the evidence identified here indicates 
it is from enhancing the patent system to economic growth.  Indeed, there are two 
apparent stages, the simpler being joining/complying with the relevant 
international conventions and the more complex involving enabling enforcement, 
which entails the general improvement in the delivery of government services, 
typically incorporating the reduction of corruption.  In general, lower income 
countries begin with institutions and later address corruption, clearly the more 
encompassing undertaking.  Investors recognize these distinctions and can interpret 
the undertaking of each step as signaling different degrees of intentions to foster 
innovations.  Yet while this is the general pattern, there are major differences in the 
efficiency of execution of these general goals across individual countries.  The task 
is not an easy one, but the benefits are clear, and substantial.  Most regrettable, 
they appear to fall short in all too many cases.  Just perhaps, highlighting the 
benefits and way forward as is done here will help, a little. 
  
LESSER- FORMAT FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:02 PM 
380 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. IV:II 
 
APPENDIX 
Appendix Table A: Bootstrap Confidence Interval Estimates, Low Income 
Countries, 4 Inputs/2 Outputs* 
Obs. DEA Corrected Bias Var. Confidence Interval 
1   0.7228   0.6544   0.06839   0.0016 0.6100 -0.7141  
2   0.3608   0.2610   0.09971   0.0049 0.2522 -0.3536  
3   1.0000   0.7949   0.20509   0.0104 0.7648 -0.9772  
4   0.3084   0.2563   0.05204   0.0009 0.2401 -0.3026  
5   1.0000   0.3280   0.67195   0.3598 0.5902 -0.9796  
6   1.0000   0.6334   0.36653   0.0450 0.6906 -0.9812  
7   0.5517   0.4381   0.11359   0.0070 0.4075 -0.5485  
8   1.0000   0.8377   0.16220   0.0061 0.7967 -0.9759  
9   0.6502   0.5972   0.05293   0.0009 0.5585 -0.6425  
10   0.6943   0.6441   0.05013   0.0010 0.5976 -0.6880  
11   0.3857   0.2600   0.12569   0.0066 0.2673 -0.3786  
12   0.6433   0.5513   0.09191   0.0021 0.5177 -0.6286  
13   0.5490   0.4706   0.07834   0.0018 0.4406 -0.5422  
14   0.5552   0.5016   0.05359   0.0008 0.4715 -0.5488  
15   0.5158   0.4731   0.04262   0.0007 0.4374 -0.5104  
16   0.7969   0.7060   0.09082   0.0029 0.6527 -0.7844  
17   0.6257   0.5619   0.06376   0.0016 0.5176 -0.6202  
18   0.7040   0.6133   0.09060   0.0025 0.5716 -0.6876  
19   0.5022   0.4444   0.05775   0.0011 0.4130 -0.4933  
20   0.4562   0.4083   0.04784   0.0008 0.3785 -0.4503  
21   0.9353   0.7689   0.16635   0.0102 0.7186 -0.9257  
22   0.6586   0.5632   0.09536   0.0035 0.5211 -0.6499  
23   0.6248   0.5283   0.09649   0.0029 0.4946 -0.6109  
24   0.8896   0.7409   0.14864   0.0069 0.6974 -0.8692  
25   0.7038   0.6318   0.07194   0.0013 0.5957 -0.6950  
26   0.3069   0.2700   0.03689   0.0005 0.2491 -0.3021  
27   0.7860   0.6952   0.09077   0.0024 0.6499 -0.7712  
28   1.0000   0.6013   0.39866   0.0619 0.6702 -0.9819  
29   1.0000   0.8242   0.17577   0.0063 0.7901 -0.9802  
30   0.7931   0.6145   0.17855   0.0137 0.5846 -0.7872  
31   0.6284   0.5795   0.04882   0.0009 0.5387 -0.6224  
*Based on 2,000 iterations 
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Appendix Table B: Bootstrap Confidence Interval Estimates, Middle  
Income Countries, 4 Inputs/2 Outputs* 
Obs. DEA Corrected Bias Var. Confidence Interval 
1 0.5954   0.5185 0.0768 0.00149 0.48989 -0.58113 
2 0.6354 0.5251 0.1102  0.00493 0.48618 -0.62772 
3 1.00 0.4226 0.5773  0.16849 0.62303 -0.97813 
4 0.8565 0.6806 0.1758  0.00830 0.66620 -0.84230 
5 0.7678 0.6580 0.1097  0.00579 0.59878 -0.75400 
6 1.00 0.4609 0.5390  0.13410 0.63541 -0.97760 
7 1.00 0.7437 0.2562 0.01923 0.73685 -0.98470 
8 0.7204 0.5874 0.1329  0.01010 0.53662 -0.71210 
9 0.3604 0.2964 0.0639 0.00104 0.28479 -0.35213 
10 0.7708 0.6836 0.0871 0.00300 0.62908 -0.75812 
11 0.9407 0.8223 0.1183  0.00655 0.75077 -0.92923  
12 0.6815 0.5855 0.0959 0.00277 0.55203 -0.66842 
13 0.8119 0.6931 0.1187  0.00408 0.65576 -0.79571 
14 0.2607 0.2007 0.0599 0.00163 0.18862 -0.25499 
15 0.7282 0.6431 0.0850 0.00325 0.59228 -0.72232 
16 0.5722 0.4673 0.1048  0.00478 0.43792 -0.56440 
17 0.5227 0.4637 0.0589  0.00119 0.43289 -0.5166 
18 0.6964 0.5882 0.1081  0.00385 0.55359 -0.68517 
19 0.688 0.5602 0.1277  0.00463 0.53570 -0.67576 
20 0.6539 0.5315 0.1223   0.00697 0.49150 -0.64006 
21 0.601 0.5282 0.0727 0.00240 0.48187 -0.59305 
22 0.5408 0.4788 0.0619 0.00157 0.44216 -0.53323 
23 0.9459 0.7768 0.1690  0.01298 0.71890 -0.93821 
24 0.4543 0.3308 0.1234 0.00674 0.32433 -0.44659 
25 0.4691 0.4233 0.0457 0.00103 0.38497 -0.46383 
26 0.2987 0.2589 0.0397 0.00061 0.23805 -0.29344 
27 0.4455 0.3862 0.0592  0.00156 0.35333 -0.43905 
28 0.5195 0.4320 0.0874 0.00457 0.38962 -0.51406 
29 0.4554 0.4061 0.0492  0.00076 0.37999 -0.45069  
30 1.00 0.2928 0.7071  0.33187 0.59955 -0.97855 
31 0.5523 0.4597 0.0925 0.00428 0.42306 -0.54903 
32 0.4799 0.3816 0.0982 0.00325 0.36608 -0.47168  
33 0.9571 0.8363 0.1207  0.00558 0.76773 -0.94052 
34 1.00 0.8022 0.1977   0.00973 0.77664 -0.98250 
35 1.00 0.7224 0.2775  0.02533 0.72053 -0.98293 
36 0.922 0.8152 0.1067  0.00482 0.75144 -0.91251 
37 1.00 0.8400 0.1599  0.00617 0.79406 -0.97732 
38 1.00 0.8432 0.1567  0.01069 0.77860 -0.98732 
39 0.971 0.8483 0.1226  0.00436 0.79640 -0.95216 
40 0.5325 0.4317 0.1007  0.00561 0.39380 -0.52524 
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41 0.3196 0.2754 0.0441 0.00059 0.25908 -0.31415 
42 0.203 0.1491 0.0538 0.00094 0.14926 -0.19863 
43 0.3511 0.2672 0.0838  0.00341 0.25198 -0.34539 
44 0.7872 0.5653 0.2218  0.01484 0.57738 -0.77351 
45 0.3265 0.2300 0.0964 0.00542 0.22283 -0.32009 
46 0.4003 0.2971 0.1031  0.00336 0.29340 -0.39390 
47 0.7651 0.6830 0.0820 0.00128 0.65197 -0.75312 
48 0.4107 0.3502 0.0604 0.00108 0.32679 -0.40214 
49 1.00 0.8778 0.1221  0.00641 0.80904 -0.99190 
50 0.8223 0.7086 0.1136  0.00397 0.66646 -0.81040  
51 1.00 0.4589 0.5410   0.12406 0.63978 -0.97852 
52 0.9151 0.8052 0.1098  0.00495 0.74264 -0.90630 
53 0.5684 0.5071 0.0612 0.00164 0.46691 -0.5621 
54 0.5481 0.4732 0.0748 0.00297 0.42872 -0.54185 
55 1.00 0.2250 0.7749 0.53596 0.57711 -0.97504 
56 0.6048 0.5474 0.0573 0.00147 0.50258 -0.59805 
57 0.4697 0.4133 0.0563  0.00131 0.37957 -0.46365 
58 0.3803 0.3382 0.0420  0.00052 0.31692 -0.37438 
59 0.623 0.5514 0.0715 0.00157 0.51462 -0.61124 
60 0.5125 0.4277 0.0847 0.00177 0.40895 -0.50311 
61 0.7455 0.6416 0.1038  0.00350 0.60021 -0.73682 
62 0.5231 0.4250 0.0980 0.00399 0.39765 -0.51376 
63 0.8135 0.6898 0.1236  0.00588 0.64352 -0.80097 
64 1.00 0.5614 0.4385 0.10305 0.64008 -0.97223 
 
